In the 24th year of Jian’an, Liu Bei experienced an intense series of dramatic events: In May, Cao Cao withdrew from Hanzhong; by July, Liu Bei assumed the titles of King of Hanzhong and Grand Marshal; in August, Guan Yu captured Yu Jin and executed Pang De, stunning all of China; and in December, Guan Yu suffered defeat at Maicheng, was captured and beheaded at Linju by Ma Zhong, a general under Pan Zhang, resulting in the total loss of Jingzhou.
The fall of Guan Yu was a devastating blow to Liu Bei, akin to losing a vital arm. After proclaiming himself emperor, Liu Bei deliberately left the position of Grand Marshal vacant, reflecting his belief that no one except Guan Yu was worthy of the role. The loss of Jingzhou was also a critical strategic setback, as it deprived Liu Bei of an essential foothold for advancing into the Central Plains, rendering even Zhuge Liang’s famed Longzhong Plan obsolete.
展开剩余90%For both Liu Bei and Zhuge Liang, losing Guan Yu and Jingzhou was like losing half their strength. The widespread speculation that “Liu Bei and Zhuge Liang conspired to kill Guan Yu” is entirely unfounded— even if Guan Yu had been arrogant or rebellious, Liu Bei and Zhuge Liang would have had countless other means to handle him without sacrificing Jingzhou and risking internal collapse.
A closer examination of Three Kingdoms historical records reveals that Zhuge Liang has been unfairly blamed. Whether to defend Jingzhou or not was beyond his authority as a relatively junior general whose primary responsibility lay in logistics and supply management. Decisions about where and when to fight were ultimately Liu Bei’s alone, without needing Zhuge Liang’s consent.
Due to the influence of the novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms, many assume that Zhuge Liang immediately rose to the second-highest position upon joining Liu Bei’s faction. In reality, his rank was lower than that of Guan Yu and Zhang Fei, and possibly even below Mi Zhu: “Appointed as General Who Pacifies Han, ranked just to the right of the Military Advisor General.” In ancient China, the right side was a position of honor, so this rank indicates that Zhuge Liang was not the foremost civil official.
The well-known dispute between Lian Po and Lin Xiangru reflects a similar principle: Lin Xiangru was appointed as Senior Minister with rank to the right of Lian Po, inciting the latter’s anger since Lin was considered a commoner by birth but held a superior rank. Likewise, Zhuge Liang’s position to the left of Mi Zhu symbolized a demotion or lower status, showing he was not the chief civil officer in formal terms.
Before Liu Bei declared himself emperor, Zhuge Liang’s rank remained Military Advisor General, previously sharing the title of Military Advisor Colonel alongside Pang Tong. When Liu Bei entered Sichuan, his chief strategist was Pang Tong; in the contest for Hanzhong, Liu Bei relied on Fa Zheng, the Administrator of Shu Commandery and General Who Raises Martial Might. Even when Liu Bei was named King of Hanzhong, Zhuge Liang remained Military Advisor General, while Fa Zheng rose to the positions of Prefect of the Secretariat and General Who Guards the Army.
Fa Zheng passed away in the second year after Liu Bei’s coronation, the same year Guan Yu died and Liu Bei proclaimed himself king. This means that from the start of the Xiangyang battle until Guan Yu’s defeat, the most influential adviser to Liu Bei was not Zhuge Liang but the Prefect of the Secretariat Fa Zheng—just as in Cao Wei, Xiahou Dun reported to the Prefect of the Secretariat Xun Yu.
The role of General Who Guards the Army was to supervise other generals and held greater authority than regional generals. At military councils combining civil and military officials, Fa Zheng would naturally be seated to the right of General Zhao Yun, who was General of the Wing Army.
The division of labor in Liu Bei’s camp was clear: Guan Yu guarded Jingzhou, Wei Yan controlled Hanzhong, Zhang Fei held Bashu, Zhuge Liang “permanently guarded Chengdu, with ample food and troops,” while Fa Zheng “commanded the outer capital region and acted as chief strategist.” Thus, if Liu Bei and Fa Zheng decided to launch a campaign, Zhuge Liang was responsible for ensuring smooth logistics and supplies.
Therefore, we should not fault Zhuge Liang for Guan Yu’s defeat at Linju—Jingzhou was Zhuge Liang’s homeland, and he would never willingly allow it to fall. There is no historical record of Fa Zheng’s specific stance on the Xiangyang campaign, but Records of the Three Kingdoms reveal Liu Bei’s deep frustration: “In the Hanzhong campaign, I was already exhausted by Cao Cao’s relentless pressure—how could I spare resources to support Guan Yu’s battle at Xiangyang?”
The Hanzhong campaign was not as easy as depicted in novels; Zhuge Liang’s logistics were stretched thin: “When the lord fought for Hanzhong, he urgently ordered troops to be dispatched. Military Advisor General Zhuge Liang consulted Yang Hong, who said: ‘Hanzhong is the throat of Yizhou. Without it, there is no Shu. This is a family disaster. At such a time, men should fight and women should transport supplies—there should be no hesitation in sending troops.’” Liu Bei gritted his teeth until Cao Cao finally retreated. The protracted battle drained Shu’s soldiers and grain, forcing harsh taxation on Sichuan’s population. Attempting to divert forces to aid Xiangyang then would have ignited chaos at home and jeopardized Liu Bei’s fragile claim to kingship.
Historian Chen Shou praised Liu Bei’s two main strategists: “Pang Tong was learned and insightful, renowned in Jing and Chu as a remarkable talent. Fa Zheng showed clear success and failure, with brilliant strategic plans, though he was not known for virtue. Comparing them to Wei’s ministers, Pang Tong resembles Xun Yu, while Fa Zheng is akin to Cheng Yu and Guo Jia.” From this context, Fa Zheng was likely Liu Bei’s most trusted adviser after Pang Tong’s death during the Luo City siege.
Fa Zheng’s strategic focus was not on Jingzhou but on Hanzhong, Yongzhou, and Liangzhou: “When we conquer these, we should stockpile grain and watch for weaknesses, so we can topple enemies and honor the royal house, while gradually encroaching on Yong and Liang and expanding territory, and defending key points for a long-term plan. Heaven has given this opportunity; it must not be missed.”
After Liu Bei declared himself emperor, he appointed Ma Chao as General of Agile Cavalry and Governor of Liangzhou, confirming his approval of Fa Zheng’s strategy. Whether to hold Jingzhou or expand westward into Yong and Liang was surely debated within Liu Bei’s camp. Guan Yu’s actions, particularly in the Xiangyang campaign and defense of Jingzhou, were also open to criticism for possibly overstepping his authority.
In the 24th year of Jian’an, Jingzhou was Liu Bei’s longstanding base, while Yizhou was a newly conquered territory. By conventional logic, Liu Bei should have fortified Jingzhou, stabilized Yizhou, and supplied Hanzhong. When Cao Cao withdrew, he took much of Hanzhong’s population with him; Liu Bei gained the land but not its people or resources.
Liu Bei’s rapid expansion created a shortage of loyal officials and generals. Besides Fa Zheng, only the Wu brothers—Wu Yi and Wu Ban—were fully trusted. Other figures like Xu Jing, Liu Ba, Zhou Qun, Zhang Yu, and Peng Yang had questionable loyalty. Even Ma Chao, with a rebellious spirit, might have sought to carve out his own kingdom.
Under these circumstances, Liu Bei’s camp prioritized stability over aggression. Guan Yu’s initiation of the Xiangyang campaign, whether voluntary or forced, could not rely on adequate support from Sichuan or Hanzhong.
Guan Yu’s order for Liu Feng and Meng Da to send troops to Xiangyang came before the defeat: “Since Guan Yu besieged Xiangyang and Xiangyang city, he repeatedly called for Feng and Da to dispatch troops for mutual aid. Feng and Da declined, citing their recent allegiance and unwillingness to be easily shaken, refusing Guan Yu’s commands.”
Liu Feng and Meng Da’s refusal stemmed from two concerns: first, newly affiliated territories like Shangyong, Fangling, and Xicheng required stability, leaving no troops to spare; second, Guan Yu, though a general and acting as Dongdu overseeing Jingzhou affairs, had no authority to command Feng and Da directly.
At that time, the three counties of Shangyong were unstable: “In the 24th year of Jian’an, Meng Da was ordered from Zigui northward to attack Fangling. Fangling’s governor Kuai Qi was killed by Da’s troops. Da planned to attack Shangyong next. Liu Bei feared Da’s sole control, so he sent Liu Feng from Hanzhong by water to join Da’s army and confront Shangyong. The Shangyong governor Shen Dan surrendered, sending family members to Chengdu as hostages.”
This passage shows tension between Liu Feng and Meng Da, who were antagonistic and often clashed, each trying to outmaneuver the other. Though Shen Dan’s family was held as hostages, the two generals and local population remained doubtful of Liu Bei’s legitimacy.
Liu Feng, Liu Bei’s adopted son, commanded Meng Da, Shen Dan, and Shen Yi, acting almost like an imperial inspector. His task was to ensure the three counties’ stability. If major forces were diverted hastily to the already-contested Xiangyang front without Liu Bei’s approval, who would be responsible for guarding the rear?
Even with Liu Feng present in Jingzhou, he could not defeat the earlier-arrived Xu Huang and the following Zhang Liao, let alone Cao Cao’s forces advancing to Mobei.
Thus, Guan Yu’s siege of Xiangyang seems somewhat rash. Whether he reported progress to Liu Bei in a timely manner is unknown. However, there is firm evidence that he captured Yu Jin and some 30,000 Cao troops but did not escort them to Chengdu as trophies: “Guan Yu used naval forces to capture Yu Jin and some 30,000 foot and cavalry troops, yet, citing lack of supplies, seized rice belonging to Sun Quan’s Xiangguan instead.”
Guan Yu’s choice to seize supplies from Sun Quan rather than ask Liu Bei for aid raises questions: Was he trying to avoid troubling his lord or seeking self-reliance? This dilemma remains unresolved, posing a lasting question for readers: With Zhuge Liang and Fa Zheng both at Liu Bei’s side, who truly bears responsibility for the loss of Jingzhou? And was Guan Yu’s campaign at Xiangyang a strategic miscalculation or a necessary risk?
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